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Abstract 
In this paper we claim that, in the WTO Appellate Body (AB)’s ruling in US — Countervailing 
Measures (China), the AB decision has not put in question the practice of imposing countervailing 
duties (CVDs). While the US has formally “lost” the case, a change in the procedures and tests used to 
motivate the CVD will allow the US to continue using this policy tool on the specified products. From 
an economic point of view, this is not welcome news since CVDs have the standard distortionary 
effects of tariffs and could go against environmental goals. From a political-economy point of view, 
the CVDs in this case appear driven by pressure of domestic manufacturers of clean energy 
technology and products. 
Keywords 
Environmental goods, countervailing duties, WTO. 
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1. Introduction 
In theory, cheaper and more widely available environmental goods (products such as wind turbines 
that facilitate the transition to sources of energy that have lower greenhouse gas emissions) are a 
positive development. The international community is facing a climate crisis, and the widespread 
adoption of cleaner energy sources is generally regarded as a primary and essential element of 
addressing this crisis. Government subsidies for environmental goods, at first blush, would seem to be 
a welcome policy choice. They address the issue that the social costs of high carbon energy sources 
are higher than the private costs. By facilitating the switch to lower carbon energy sources, subsidies 
of clean energy promote the goal of pollution reduction (given a context characterized by lack of 
appropriate carbon taxes due to political infeasibility of such taxes in major economies).  
The international response to subsidies, however, has been anything but encouraging thus far. The 
United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China are arguably in a trade war over government 
support for environmental goods, including solar panels, wind turbines, and biofuels. In particular, the 
EU is imposing exceptionally large antidumping duties (ADs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) on 
Chinese environmental goods and US biodiesel. The US is imposing large ADs and CVDs on Chinese 
environmental goods. Also, China is imposing CVDs on the US, EU, and South Korean environmental 
goods (Kasteng 2013, Lewis 2014b). This tit-for-tat application of domestic trade remedies on 
environmental goods has raised domestic prices for consumers in major markets, and potentially 
chilled investment by making the future market for these goods uncertain. 
States are making some multilateral efforts to liberalize trade in environmental goods by lowering 
bound MFN tariff rates through the WTO and ASEAN, but these efforts are not gaining traction. 
States have not even been able to reach a consensus on the definition of environmental goods, and 
there seems to be little political support to push forward quickly. Moreover, none of the existing draft 
agreements exempt environmental goods from domestic trade remedies (AD/CVDs/safeguards), which 
can have a much bigger impact than the MFN tariff rate on the retail prices of these goods. Finally, 
although the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement used to have a carve-out for 
environmental goods, there also appears to be no political will to revive it. 
Because of the political difficulties in making progress on a new agreement, commentators have 
frequently looked to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) to craft trade law decisions that would have the 
effect of liberalizing the trade in environmental goods (Crosby & Mavroidis 2014). This includes calls 
for the AB to provide wide flexibility for states to adopt pro-environmental policy under GATT 
Article XX and under the SCM agreement (Howse 2013). In addition, there has been some hope that 
the AB would restrict the conditions under which WTO members could apply domestic trade remedies 
to environmental goods (Wu and Salzman 2013).  
Against this background, we analyze the present AB decision, US-Countervailing Duty Measures 
on Products from China. This case addresses the US application of countervailing duties (CVDs) on a 
number of products, two of which are environmental products (solar panels and wind turbines). We 
focus our analysis on these goods although the AB does not discuss CVDs on these two goods any 
differently than any of the other challenged goods. 
We argue that: 1. although China “won” this case, the AB decision did not meaningfully restrict the 
application of CVDs to environmental goods in future cases; 2. from an economic viewpoint, this is 
likely to be welfare-reducing to the extent that the reduction in international prices due to these 
policies is not strong enough to compensate for the increase in domestic prices and for the domestic 
distortions of the CVD; 3. that to make any real progress on more liberalized trade in environmental 
goods, we need to move away from a reliance on the AB and focus on gaining political support for a 
new agreement.  
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2. The Legal Perspective 
2.1 The Appellate Body’s Ruling 
The AB decision in this case addressed the United States Department of Commerce’s (USDOC) 
application of CVDs on 17 products from China. The primary issue that the AB resolved concerned 
the investigating authority’s (the USDOC) creation of a benchmark to evaluate the producer’s benefit 
from the alleged Chinese government subsidy. The SCM Agreement requires both that the government 
offers a subsidy and that domestic firms receive a benefit from the subsidy for an importing state to 
impose a CVD (SCM Article 1.1). The importing country can impose a duty only up to the point that 
the foreign government subsidy provided the exporting firm with a benefit (SCM Article 14(d)). This 
appeal addresses the methodology by which an investigating authority can determine the benchmark 
for evaluating the benefit of the government subsidy. Specifically, this dispute between the US and 
China concerns how the US (the investigative authority) calculates the level of benefit from a firm’s 
receipt of below-market–price inputs from the Chinese government (the subsidizing government). 
When a government provides a subsidy through below-market-price inputs, the value of the subsidy is 
not directly transparent (as a cash subsidy or tax credit would be). The value of the subsidy is 
determined by reference to the market value of the good (SCM Article 14(d)). The dispute in this case 
concerned how an investigating state can determine what the “market benchmark” is for calculating 
the firm’s benefit from the subsidy. The AB cut a middle ground between the two member states’ 
arguments, determining that US procedures are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, but also 
rejecting China’s argument that the activities of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are not acting as 
public bodies can never be relevant to the choice of the market benchmark. 
The critical issue in this case hinged on the US measurement of the Chinese firms’ benefit from the 
government subsidy. The SCM Agreement requires investigative authorities (the government applying 
the CVD) to perform a “subsidy-offered” analysis and a “benefit-received” analysis as part of its CVD 
regulatory process. The SCM Agreement is symmetrical in that the subsidy that the government offers 
and the benefit that the firm receives must be opposite sides of the same transaction. This requirement 
becomes an important point for the present Appellate Body decision. The level of benefit that the firm 
receives must be tied to the government subsidy (rather than any advantage that the firm receives from 
sources other than the government). In the first analysis, the panel looks to see if the government 
offers a subsidy. The subsidy can come from any number of sources, including government guaranteed 
loans (lowering the interest rate to the firm and costing the government nothing if the firm repays the 
loan), tax credits, direct payments, the supply of inputs at below-market prices, or the purchase of the 
producer’s goods at above-market prices. The benefit to the firm may be greater than the cost to the 
government of offering the subsidy (for instance, government guaranteed loans that the firm repays) or 
less than the cost to the government (for instance, direct subsidies that require the use of more 
expensive local products). The benefit to the firm must come only from the government subsidy, 
although the cost to the government of offering the subsidy does not need to match the firm’s benefit. 
China’s argument was that the US’s CVD procedures were decoupling the firm’s benefit from the 
government subsidy from the CVD rate, and that the US’s benefit methodology was setting a CVD 
rate that effectively included actions by the Chinese government and by SOEs that were not public 
bodies (the latter cannot give a subsidy under CVD rules). China’s argument began by pointing out 
that past AB decisions have highlighted that “government” subsidies can only come from the 
government directly or from public bodies – that is, organizations controlled by the government that 
provide a public function. SOEs can be, but are not necessarily, public bodies. The analysis of whether 
a SOE is a public body does not depend on the level of financial support the SOE offers to a firm or 
industry, but rather on whether the SOE is performing a “government function” – that is, providing 
support that is part of the government’s sovereign function. An SOE can be government-controlled – 
meaning the government can own a majority or controlling share of the company – and yet not be a 
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public body because it does not perform any government functions (and thus should be treated like a 
private firm for CVD purposes).  
The specific procedure that China challenged was the US’s rejection of Chinese domestic prices for 
determining the value of the subsidy – inputs from the government that were sold to the firms at below 
market prices. Article 14(d) requires that calculation of a firm’s benefit from the input supplied by the 
government be determined by comparing the price of the government-supplied input to the prevailing 
market price.
1
 China and the US disagreed about when the investigative authority could reject “in-
country” prices (domestic Chinese prices) as the market benchmark to determine the level of the 
firm’s benefit.  
The benchmark is important because it establishes the level of benefit that the firm enjoyed by 
receiving below-market-price inputs from the government. For instance, if the domestic Chinese price 
for Widget A is $10 and the price of the government supplied Widget A is $6, then the benefit to the 
firm from the subsidy is $4. The maximum CVD per good that the investigative authority could then 
impose would also be $4 (as this is the extent of the firm’s benefit). If the investigating authority 
rejects the in-country price because the market is distorted (and thus cannot establish a market price 
based on supply and demand), then the benchmark can be much higher. For instance, if the 
investigating authority selects State B as a the relevant country to supply the benchmark (because 
there is a market price there) and the State B’s price for Widget A is $14, then the benefit that the firm 
receives from the subsidy jumps 100% to $8. Similarly, the maximum CVD that the investigating 
authority can now impose increases to $8 per good. Higher CVDs are adverse for exporting firms, but 
advantageous to import-competing firms in the investigating state (although firms in the investigating 
state that use the foreign good as an input are disadvantaged). 
China next argued that the US procedures are de facto decoupling the government subsidy from the 
CVD rate because the US government was treating the actions of SOEs that were not public bodies as 
relevant to the benchmark. To make this next step, the Chinese government observed that the US 
government had rejected in-country prices for inputs because the US alleged that Chinese SOEs were 
distorting the domestic market and thus making it impossible for the US to formulate a Chinese 
“market price” based on supply and demand. As such, the US rejected in-country Chinese prices and 
established a benchmark based on out-of-country prices. The US justified this decision because it 
claimed that only out-of-country prices could establish a “market price” for the government-supplied 
input. The Chinese government highlighted that the actions of non-public-body SOEs (not government 
subsidies) were responsible for the difference between in-country prices and the out-of-country prices. 
To make this (hopefully) clearer, consider the example of the USDOC’s CVD investigation 
regarding Chinese inputs of polysilicon in solar panels. In that investigation, the USDOC simply 
noted that China had an ownership or management interest in 37 of the 47 producers of polysilicon 
in China. A government ownership interest does not turn a producer into a public body capable of 
providing a subsidy. Nonetheless, a high proportion of SOEs in a specific market can be sufficient 
to reject in-country prices as non-market based. The USDOC did reject in-country prices in this 
instance, stating, “we determine that the GOC [Government of China] is the predominant provider 
of polysilicon in the PRC and that its significant presence in the market distorts all transaction 
prices” (para. 4.94).  
This rejection of in-country prices can have the same functional effect (in terms of CVD rates) as 
treating non-public-body SOEs as public SOEs providing a subsidy. Where a non-public-body 
SOE market presence leads an investigating authority to reject in-country prices and adopt higher 
out-of-country prices, then that difference in country prices is functionally the same as a subsidy in 
                                                     
1
 Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement states “the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government 
shall not be considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the 
purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to 
prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, 
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).” 
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terms of the CVD rate. For instance, if the unit price of polysilicon is $10 in China and $14 in the 
out-of-country price, the CVD rate can be $4 per unit higher if out-of-country prices are used (just 
as if the Chinese government gave a $4 per unit subsidy). Here the CVD rate increases by $4 
notwithstanding the fact that the non-public SOEs cannot provide a subsidy under SCM rules. 
China argued that this US practice was inconsistent with the SCM Agreement because it violated 
the symmetry of the government offered subsidy being the source of the firm’s benefit.  
In less technical terms, the Chinese argument is essentially this: the US can only count government or 
public body support as a subsidy to the firm in either the “government offered” or the “benefit 
received” analysis. The US knows that it cannot count any support from non-public body SOEs 
through the front door, so it is counting non-public body SOEs’ support through the back door. That 
back door is the out-of-country price benchmark. Thus, China argued that the AB should require the 
US to use in-country prices as its benefit benchmark (and thereby disallowing the US practice of 
counting non-public body SOEs’ actions in the market in the “benefit-received” analysis). The 
Chinese government made this argument textually by maintaining that there could not be two different 
definitions of the word ‘government.’ China maintained that the SCM agreement could have only one 
definition of the term “government” and thus the actions of non-public body SOEs should not enter 
into the benchmark analysis (paras 4.37-4.39). 
The US rejects this position, arguing that it was entitled to use out-of-country prices when there 
was not a domestic market to establish a market price based on supply and demand. Because the 
Chinese market was distorted by the predominant presence of SOEs, in-country prices would be 
artificially below true market prices. As a result, the US claimed that the only accurate way to value 
the firms’ benefit from the government subsidy was to adopt out-of-country prices. The US’s position 
was not that it was entitled to count non-public-body SOEs’ activity as contributing to the subsidy, but 
rather that the only means of accurately determining the true value of the subsidy was to look to 
markets that were not distorted by SOEs’ activity. Thus the US claim was an evidentiary one – that the 
only good evidence of true market prices existed outside of the Chinese market, and thus it could 
reject in-country prices – not a substantive claim that the US was justified including non-public-body 
SOEs’ activity into the benefit analysis. Importantly, however, the US adopted a standard that 
presumed the Chinese market was distorted whenever the government or SOEs were the predominant 
provider of the input. 
The AB forged a middle ground, rejecting China’s argument that the US could never use out-of-
country prices to establish a market benchmark, but also rejecting the US’s SOE market presence 
approach by demonstrating that Chinese prices were in fact distorted. The AB began by accepting 
China’s argument that there is only one definition of the word “government” in the SCM Agreement 
(para. 4.42) but rejecting the idea that this meant that activities of non-public-body SOEs could not be 
relevant to the benefit benchmark. As the AB put it, “China’s argument that there is a single standard 
for defining the term ‘government’ does not answer the question of whether the prices of goods 
provided by private or government-related entities in the country of provision are to be considered as 
market determined for purposes of selecting a benefit benchmark” (para. 4.43). The AB recounted 
how previous AB decisions explicitly allowed an investigating authority to reject in-country prices if 
there was not a domestic “market” price because the market was distorted by government subsidies. 
Particularly in US-Carbon Steel (India) and US-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
prior AB rulings established that investigating authorities could reject in-country prices (and thus shift 
to an out-of-country price benchmark) when government activity in the domestic market had distorted 
prices (paras 4.45-4.54, 4.65). Citing US-Carbon Steel (India), the AB noted that it “would not be 
appropriate” to use in-country prices when the government has used its market power to lower private 
prices of the input because “this would lead to a calculation of benefit that is artificially low, or even 
zero, [thus] the right of Members to countervail subsidies could be undermined or circumvented in 
such a scenario” (para. 4.50). 
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Having established that investigating authorities could in theory reject in-country prices in the 
benefits analysis, the AB then raised the evidentiary bar for allowing them to do so. The AB 
emphasized that the link between government predominance in the market and price distortion was 
one that the investigating authority had to actually demonstrate before turning to out-of-country prices. 
The AB “clarified” its decision in US-Softwood Lumber IV by repudiating the idea that an 
investigating authority could adopt a per se rule that domestic prices were distorted anytime that a 
government was the predominant supplier in the market (para. 4.52). The AB further found that the 
USDOC had not adequately demonstrated that such a link existed in the CVD investigations of this 
issue because the USDOC had adopted a per se rule that government predominance could be equated 
to market distortion (para. 4.80). To be consistent with the SCM Agreement, the USDOC would have 
to perform a case-by-case analysis of whether the subsidizing state’s domestic market was distorted by 
government action (by either public bodies or non-public body SOEs). The USDOC would 
additionally have to offer an adequate explanation of its methodology and how its determined markets 
were, in fact, distorted (para. 4.84). In short, the AB found that the US could not just assume that there 
was not a “real” market in China simply because of the presence of SOEs.   
2.2 Analysis of the Ruling for Future CVD Cases 
This decision continued the AB’s attempt to put limits on states’ use of CVDs while accepting that 
members were entitled under the WTO Agreements to use CVDs under certain conditions. Indeed, the 
AB stated in its reasoning that it did not want to undermine or circumvent the “right” of members to 
apply CVDs even to environmental goods (para. 4.50). The current decision did not go particularly far 
in restricting investigating authorities from using out-of-country prices in establishing a benefit 
benchmark. The AB did not put any substantive limits on the benchmark analysis. In rejecting China’s 
position, the AB endorsed the idea that high out-of-country price benchmarks were more appropriate 
even when the in-country prices were influenced by non-public-body SOEs. The limits established by 
the AB in this case were procedural. The AB imposed new process requirements for investigating 
authorities before in-country prices could be rejected.  
These new process requirements may end up being a rather loose binding on an investigating 
authority for several reasons. First, a big question going forward is how closely the WTO panels or 
AB are going to scrutinize a USDOC decision that the Chinese market is distorted by SOE activity. 
The AB seemed to show its hand that it would be sympathetic to findings of distortion when there is a 
large government presence in the market when the AB noted that “[a]lthough a government’s 
predominance in the market makes it likely that prices will be distorted, the distortion of in-country 
prices must be established on the basis of the particular facts underlying each countervailing duty 
investigation” (para. 4.51, emphasis added). Such a statement does not indicate that panels should give 
a hard look to an investigating state’s determination that in-country prices are distorted. Rather, it 
indicates a fair level of deference to investigating authority’s findings so long as they perform a case-
by-case analysis. 
Second, the AB essentially lays out a “WTO-compliance action plan” for CVD application that 
does not require much real change. Even though the AB completed the legal analysis in four of the 
CVD cases and found that the USDOC had erroneously rejected in-country prices for the benefit 
benchmark, the AB failed to say that the USDOC could not continue to reject in-country prices in 
future cases against the same products. For instance, in the solar panels CVD case, the AB determined 
that the USDOC had incorrectly rejected in-country prices because it “did not explain whether and 
how the relevant 37 producers possessed and exerted market power such that other in-country prices 
were distorted” (para. 4.96). However, the AB’s previous statement that government market 
predominance makes distortion “likely” indicates that it would be receptive to a USDOC finding of 
price distortion (37 out of 47 firms were SOEs) if the USDOC had provided a case specific analysis of 
how the market was distorted. The USDOC simply needs to clean up its procedures – by doing the 
case-by-case analysis – and it can effectively maintain its current policies. This case may be analogous 
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to the US “loss” in United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (better 
known as the Shrimp-Turtle case) where the AB found the US measures to be inconsistent with GATT 
rules. However, the AB effectively set out a path to compliance that is relatively easy for the US to 
meet. If the US made only modest changes to its policies, it might then be able to receive WTO 
approval for its policies through the DSU Article 21.5 compliance process. Thus, while the US “lost” 
this case in the sense that the AB found the USDOC’s rule to be inconsistent with the SCM 
Agreement, the effect of this ruling may give Chinese exporters little comfort.
2
  
The US may be more constrained in future cases by the panel’s decision that the US erred by 
presuming that inputs provided by SOEs were government subsidies for the SCM 1.1(a) government 
contribution analysis. The panel found that the USDOC needed to provide an analysis of whether the 
SOEs were performing a government function. If not, then the SOEs would not be public bodies and 
any contribution from these entities would not be government contributions under the SCM 
Agreement. The US did not appeal this finding and thus the issue was not included in our review of 
the AB’s decision. Nonetheless, this issue may prove to be more of a substantive constraint on the 
investigating authority in future cases if the AB establishes a narrow scope for government functions.  
2.3 The (Un)Importance of Benchmarks for Environmental Goods 
For all of the previous analyses of benchmarks and SOEs’ activity, the importance of the AB’s review 
of the CVD process (and all trade remedy processes) may be pretty minimal for liberalizing trade in 
environmental goods. Member states can game the system by applying these duties and then removing 
them after the WTO dispute resolution process finds them inconsistent with trade rules. Member states 
do not face any penalties for these actions and they do not even have to refund the past years’ duties. 
Particularly in environmental goods, where technological change is rapid, the WTO’s slow pace has 
difficulty providing meaningful protection to these goods through the DSU’s review of members’ 
CVD investigations. As a result, some broader (probably non-judicial) approach is needed to liberalize 
trade in this area.  
The application of CVDs (as well as anti-dumping duties) is essentially a unilateral state process 
with WTO oversight of the outcomes. This means that member states can impose CVD/AD duties, 
wait to see if another state will take the case to the WTO, and then wait until the WTO review is 
complete before altering any of the duties. So long as the member state complies at the end of the 
WTO dispute resolution process, the breaching member state does not have to offer any compensation 
to the member injured by the breach (and does not have offer retrospective damages even if 
compliance is not forthcoming) (Schwartz and Sykes 2002, Brewster 2011). 
The entire process can easily take three years or more. That is four years that the investigating 
authority can impose duties without any meaningful constraint by the WTO. In the present case, China 
was challenging the US’s application of CVDs imposed between 2007-2012. The AB opinion was 
issued in December 2014, and the US has a “reasonable period of time” after the decision to alter its 
policy. Thus the US is able to impose duties unilaterally for 3-8 years. In a fast turnover technology 
sector such as solar panels, three years is effectively the life of the product cycle (Horlick 2013). By 
the time that the WTO is able to review a nation’s CVD or AD process, the duty served its purpose 
and a new duty can be applied to the next generation of environmental goods. As a result, alternatives 
need to be found that bypass the CVD/AD domestic remedy process entirely.  
                                                     
2
 Howse (2012) makes a similar argument regarding EU’s Aviation Emissions trading rules, noting that “[i]f the WTO 
dispute settlement organs find in favor of the challengers because of some detailed aspect of the application of the EU 
scheme that the EU could easily tweak, then they would have won the battle but lost the war, as it were.”  
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3. The Economic Perspective 
In this section, we discuss the economic aspects of the WTO Appellate Body’s ruling in US — 
Countervailing Measures (China) focusing on solar panels (SPs) and wind turbines (WTs). Subsection 
3.1 presents the framework for the welfare analysis of both the subsidy imposed by China and the 
CVD imposed by the US government in response. The following subsections apply the framework to 
first the subsidy and then the CVD and present empirical evidence to answer the following questions: 
1) does the instrument address a market distortion and, if so, is that instrument the first-best tool to 
address the distortion; 2) is the subsidy/CVD motivated by “strategic trade-policy” goals; 3) does the 
subsidy/CVD have an impact on social welfare in the rest of the world through the “terms-of-trade” 
channel; 4) and could there political-economy motives behind the subsidy and CVD? 
3.1 The Welfare Analysis Framework 
In order to analyze welfare effects, it is important to focus on some key aspects of the markets 
considered, related to their size and structure in each country and to the existence of distortions. In 
particular, as we discuss the welfare effects, we will need to take into account the answers to the 
following questions: 
1. Does a market failure related to the environment exist? In particular, what kind of externality is 
it associated with, a production or a consumption externality? Is the externality local or global? 
2. Are China and the US, respectively, net importers or net exporters of SPs and WTs? 
3. Are China and the US, respectively, “small” or “large” economies in the markets considered? 
4. Is the market structure of the SPs and WTs markets competitive or is there some degree of 
market power? 
5. Are the markets of SPs and WTs politically organized in China and the US? 
We address each of these questions and provide empirical evidence (when available). 
Regarding the first question, given the nature of the goods considered it is likely that an 
environmental market failure exists and that it is global in nature. Electricity produced from fossil 
fuels is associated with high levels of carbon emissions, a negative externality which gives rise to a 
market failure. The private marginal cost for producers of fossil-fuel electricity will not account for 
this externality, which implies that there will be over-production of fossil-fuel electricity compared to 
socially optimal levels. The reduction in carbon emissions from SPs and WTs comes from substituting 
consumption of carbon-intensive electricity with consumption of clean generated electricity such as 
solar and wind. In addition, carbon emissions affect all countries in the world, no matter where the 
generation of carbon-intensive electricity takes places, i.e. the negative externality is global because its 
effects cross borders. 
To address the second question, we use data on imports and exports at the 6-digit Harmonized 
System (HS) level for SPs (854140) and WTs (730820)
3
 to determine whether the US and China are 
net exporters or importers of these products (our data is up to 2013). China imported a very small 
amount of SPs from 1996 until 2007 but since 2007 it has become a net exporter of SPs. In addition, 
China has been a net exporter of WTs since 1998. The US has been a net importer of SPs throughout 
the period we consider (1996-2013), while it has been a net importer of WTs since 2001. See Figures 1 
through 4. In terms of production and consumption, some observers note that, until recently, almost all 
production of SPs and WTs by Chinese manufacturers was exported. However, since 2010 China has 
invested heavily in deploying solar capacity locally, as detailed below.  
                                                     
3
 The 6-digit HS code 730820 is a code for "towers and lattice matts", which includes WTs but not exclusively. 
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The third question, whether the US and China are “small” or “large” economies in the markets of 
SPs and WTs, is essential to determine the terms-of-trade effect of the welfare analysis. Following the 
literature (see, for example, Broda, Limão and Weinstein 2008 and Ludema and Mayda 2013), we can 
measure an importing country’s market power in a given market with the inverse elasticity of export 
supply. Based on this measure, for both WTs and SPs, the US and China are “large” economies.4  
Regarding question 4, we can gather information on the structure of the markets of SPs and WTs in 
China and the US, respectively, by calculating the extent of concentration of these markets across 
firms. One measure of concentration is the market share of the top 5 firms. A market is considered 
oligopolistic if the top 5 firms account for over 50 percent of the market. Figure 5 shows that the top 5 
wind turbine manufacturers in the world in 2012 accounted for 56% of this market, which suggests 
that the world market of WTs is oligopolistic. The world market of SPs on the other hand is 
competitive. In 2012, the top five producers of solar modules accounted for just around a quarter of 
the market (Figure 6). 
The local markets in China and the US look different though. Figure 7 shows market shares by 
locally-owned firms in leading domestic wind markets in the year 2012. The US market for WTs 
appears more concentrated than the world market, while the Chinese one is less. But in wind, both 
markets can be considered oligopolistic. As for solar, the US market for SPs is highly oligopolistic 
with up to 83 percent of production concentrated in the top 5 producers (Statista 2015), while the 
Chinese market is considered highly competitive (Haley and Haley 2013). Therefore, outside of the 
Chinese and world SP industry, all relevant markets exhibit some degree of market power.  
Finally, data from Ludema and Mayda (2013) shows that both HS 6-digit codes 730820 (WTs) and 
854140 (SPs) are politically organized sectors in the US (political organization is measured by the 
presence of business associations). Data for China on sectors’ political organization are not available, 
but the fact that a WTO case was filed against the US CVD suggests some degree of political 
organization. 
3.2 Social-Welfare Rationale for the Chinese Subsidy on SPs and WTs 
In this section we analyze the social-welfare rationale for the Chinese subsidy from a theoretical point 
of view for Chinese and rest-of-the-world (ROW) welfare. From the point of view of China’s social 
welfare, we need to explore whether the subsidy under scrutiny was meant to address market 
distortions. Some distortions might be specific to environmental goods, others may not. 
As discussed above, the production of electricity from fossil fuels creates a negative externality in 
the form of carbon emissions, a global pollutant which affects the whole world. To reduce global 
carbon emissions from electricity generation, the first-best tool would be a global tax on carbon. There 
are two reasons why subsidies are not first best. First, subsidies tip the scale in favor of a particular 
technology while a global tax on carbon allows each firm to choose its most efficient abatement 
option. Second, subsidies, unlike taxes, increase the profitability of the industry, which induces entry 
of potentially inefficient firms.  
Unfortunately, a global carbon tax has proven to be politically infeasible. As a result, an alternative 
way to address the negative externality associated with the production of fossil-fuel electricity is to 
encourage alternative forms of energy that are clean – in particular, generating electricity using SPs 
and WTs does not produce greenhouse gases. As world consumption of clean energy increases, the 
world use and production of fossil fuel electricity decreases – other things held equal – which in turn 
implies a reduction in the negative externality. 
                                                     
4
 Note that these estimates of market power are for the 90’s but it is likely that, if anything, the market power of these two 
importing countries has increased in more recent years. 
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The most direct way to increase world consumption of SPs and WTs is to subsidize their 
consumption. The Chinese subsidy under scrutiny was to production, not consumption, and it targeted 
Chinese as opposed to world production. However, since China is a “large” economy in these markets, 
the subsidy has likely decreased the world price of SPs and WTs and thus has increased ROW 
consumption these goods, besides having increased Chinese consumption. In addition, since pollution 
is global, the increase in world consumption of these goods and the associated decrease in greenhouse 
gas emissions gives rise to an increase in Chinese and ROW welfare.  
It is therefore possible to justify the Chinese subsidy on the grounds that it corrects an 
environmental market failure, although the question remains whether the subsidy is too large or too 
small to optimally address the environmental problem. 
The subsidy could also tackle more general market failures. Suboptimal investment levels can 
occur when firms cannot be fully compensated for their investment. A firm investing in research and 
development might be concerned that its innovation could be imitated by competitors or have 
spillovers into other industries. These failures can result in suboptimal levels of investment in SPs and 
WTs innovation, or in a diversion of innovative resources away from radically new technologies in 
favor of more incremental innovation. This failure can be exacerbated if prices are too low to provide 
incentives to innovate.  
Subsidies can also address an infant-industry type of market failure. In some cases, an industry 
could have latent comparative advantage, which only kicks in when a certain threshold of production 
is attained (i.e. economies of scale exist, but the firms in the industry do not internalize them, which 
gives rise to an externality). Or capital market imperfections could make it difficult for young 
industries or small firms to secure funding. However, latent comparative advantage is difficult to 
identify ahead of time, and so there is no guarantee that the benefit of protecting an industry will 
outweigh the cost. Governments also suffer from information failures and could mis-time or mis-target 
the intervention. 
The most efficient subsidy would be global: it would encourage an increase in the world use of SPs 
and WTs – and therefore a decrease in world use and production of fossil fuel electricity – but would 
allow for the production of SPs and WTs to take place where the comparative advantage is greatest. 
Instead, a local subsidy will target production of a specific country, in this case China. If China has a 
comparative advantage in the production of SPs and WTs, the local subsidy is a good tool. If instead it 
is welfare enhancing to produce SPs and WTs in other countries – because of factor endowments, 
technology, or carbon footprint of production and transport – the subsidy is distorting the world 
allocation of production. The question is then whether it is globally welfare enhancing for the majority 
of SPs and WTs to be built in China.  
Thus subsidies to SPs and WTs can be justified on the basis of various types of market failures. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that subsidies should meet two conditions (Kemp 1960). 
First, the supported section should eventually be able to survive and compete globally without the 
subsidy. Making sure that firms can eventually survive without the subsidy also helps alleviate 
concerns that the subsidies are distorting the allocation of productive resources towards inefficient 
firms. Since subsidies create rents, firms will lobby to maintain them even when they are no longer 
necessary. An agreement which would allow environmental subsidies should make sure to address 
how and when to remove the subsidies. Second, the total cost of support should be outweighed by the 
present discounted value of benefits. Costs include financing of the subsidy through taxes which can 
create distortions. Benefits include potential employment gains from increased output as well as global 
environmental benefits. 
Beyond market failures, subsidies are sometimes given for “strategic trade-policy” motives, i.e. as 
a way to favor Chinese firms in export markets, which are not competitive (see Brander and Spencer 
1985). This scenario is more likely if the subsidies are targeted to exports as opposed to production. 
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Knowing with certainty whether the motive of the subsidy is strategic or environmental or associated 
with other market failures is a difficult task.  
In terms of ROW welfare, since the subsidy increases world consumption of SPs and WTs and thus 
decreases global pollution, it gives rise to an increase in ROW social welfare. In addition, we need to 
take into account the impact of the subsidy on international prices. Since the subsidizing country 
(China) is a large economy, the increase in world supply will decrease international prices. Therefore 
countries which are net importers of SPs and WTs will benefit from the Chinese subsidy since they 
will be able to import SPs and WTs for a lower price (i.e., these countries will experience a terms-of-
trade improvement). The opposite is true for net exporting countries. In both sets of countries, 
domestic consumers will benefit from the reduction in prices, while domestic producers will be hurt. 
3.3 Empirical Evidence on the Impact of the Chinese Subsidy on SPs and WTs 
Following up on the theoretical arguments, and having previously determined that China and the US 
are “large” economies, we investigate whether there is any empirical evidence that the subsidy given 
by the Chinese government has been effective in improving China’s social welfare and ROW social 
welfare. The evidence we will provide is anecdotal and not meant to be interpreted causally. 
Although a large portion of Chinese production of SPs is exported, China has invested heavily in 
the domestic deployment of solar energy since 2010 and therefore has become an important consumer 
of SPs. From less than 1GW of solar capacity in 2010, China had installed almost 30GW by 2014, 
pulling it to second position worldwide after Germany. This trend is expected to continue as China 
installed the equivalent of France’s entire capacity in just the first quarter of 2015. By the end of 2015, 
China will have installed new capacity equivalent to more than twice the new capacity installed in the 
United States in 2014. 
Yet, despite record SPs installations in the past few years, manufacturing capacity far exceeded 
demand in China. By 2010, China was the single largest producer of SPs, supplying 45 percent of 
world production (ChinaGlobalTrade 2012). These high levels of SPs production have resulted in a 
sharp decline in prices in recent years (IRENA 2014). As mentioned above, the decrease in world 
prices of SPs benefits consumers and hurts producers, all over the world. For example, there is 
evidence that the fall in prices also hurt some Chinese firms, as evidenced by a series of bankruptcies 
in 2012 and 2013 (Stanford GSB 2013). These bankruptcies indicate that the subsidies might have 
been encouraging overcapacity by firms that are not efficient enough to compete in global markets. 
From an environmental perspective, cheaper SPs leads to more adoption of solar energy, and 
therefore to lower emissions worldwide, all else held equal. Until recently, the high costs of SPs were 
deemed to be a major obstacle to solar adoption. The reduction in prices therefore contributed to 
promoting solar deployment. However, with the decrease in prices, SPs represent only a small portion 
of the total cost of a photovoltaic (PV) system, which is now mainly made of the costs of installation, 
marketing, and permitting. Price declines in SPs will no longer be the main driver of cost reduction of 
solar PV installations. Therefore, reducing the price of panels further through subsidies or other means 
will no longer be a major contributor to solar adoption and further emission reductions. The 
environmental externality of solar panel subsidies will therefore become harder to argue. 
Also from an environmental point of view, whether it is globally welfare enhancing to produce the 
majority of SPs in China depends both on their production’s carbon footprint and the pollution 
reduction they achieve. A study found that the carbon footprint of Chinese SPs is twice as high as 
European SPs and that the energy use efficiency is 30 percent lower (Yue et al 2014). Those two facts 
combined would suggest it might not be optimal for SPs to be built in China. In addition, much of the 
consumption of SPs happens in Europe and the US, which means there are also shipping emissions 
costs. A related question would be whether the US is the optimal place to deploy the SPs and WTs, 
depending on the amount of carbon displaced. In 2010, the carbon intensity of the energy sector in 
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China surpassed that of the US, but the US ranked amongst the countries with the highest carbon 
intensities (IEA 2013). 
In terms of wind, world prices of WTs declined precipitously after 2008. The capacity increase in 
WTs originated in part in China. The Chinese market had such large excess capacity by 2009 that the 
Ministry of Land and Resources started to deny applications for new WTs manufacturing facilities 
(Lewis 2015). Since 2009, China has dramatically increased its domestic WTs installation, while other 
countries experienced a slow-down. China is now the top country in terms of new WTs installations 
(GWEC 2013).  
In terms of welfare, China is a growing player in WT production and the price of Chinese turbines 
was half the price of US turbines in 2012. Nonetheless, the six top Chinese firms combined still 
account for less global market share than each of the world leaders, Vestas or General Electric (Lewis 
2015). Still, the recent sharp decline in Chinese WT production costs combined with lower shipping 
costs have helped China gain a larger global market share, affecting Europe’s and the US’s capacity to 
compete. The Chinese subsidies are most likely responsible for at least part of the lower production 
costs. However, the lack of competition in China might have led to inefficiencies in the Chinese wind 
industry, and Chinese turbines suffer from reliability issues (Wang, Qin, and Lewis 2012), which 
suggests a negative effect on both Chinese and global social welfare. The question is whether the 
positive effect on welfare from lower prices overcomes the negative effect from inefficiencies in 
energy use. 
In sum, it appears that in both solar and wind China has global market power and affects world 
prices. The subsidies contribute to lowering world prices through increased supply and competitive 
cost structures. In turn, this benefits world consumers, but hurts competing suppliers. The positive 
effect on consumers will offset the loss to import-competing producers so the importing country will 
be better off overall. Nonetheless, for strategy trade reasons or political economy reasons, it might still 
be in the interest of the importing country to respond to the subsidies. Environmentally, cheaper SPs 
and WTs could contribute to increased deployment of clean energies, and therefore to reductions in 
polluting fossil-fuel energy sources, a global welfare improvement. However, the subsidies might also 
be distorting efficient markets by incentivizing the production of lower-cos but less energy-efficient 
SPs and WTs.  
3.4 Political-Economy Considerations Regarding the Chinese Subsidies to SPs 
Besides social welfare considerations, the Chinese subsidy could be motivated by political-economy 
reasons. The subsidy under scrutiny could have been given under political pressure by local Chinese 
firms for rent-seeking or political motives. Many studies find that the allocation of subsidies is 
correlated with the political influence of the beneficiaries. Grossman and Helpman (1994) developed 
one of the foremost models of the influence of special interests groups on trade and subsidy policy. 
The bottom line is that incumbent politicians care about maximizing social welfare but also about 
financial contributions. The second element will incentivize them to offer trade and subsidy policies to 
special interest groups, leading to socially suboptimal outcomes. Obviously social-welfare 
considerations and rent-seeking ones can both be motivating factors for government policy. The 
question how much each factor contributed to this subsidy is not possible to answer here.  
Finally note that, both from a social-welfare point of view and from a political-economy point of 
view, the discussion on clean energy has been recently linked to the issue of jobs, “green jobs” and 
“green growth”. However, evidence on whether renewable energy policies have a positive effect on 
economic activity in OECD countries is mixed (Brunel, 2015). On the one hand, renewable energy 
policies, including subsidies, do not appear to boost domestic innovation in renewable energy 
technologies as firms adopt existing foreign technologies. On the other hand, the policies and resulting 
technology adoption do lead to a significant increase in domestic manufacturing production (and thus 
potentially on jobs in the renewable sector). 
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3.5 Countervailing Duties 
CVDs were imposed by the US on a number of products – which include SPs and WTs – imported 
from China to offset the impact of alleged subsidies. Here, we discuss these CVDs’ welfare effects.  
Unlike subsidies to address environmental market failures, a CVD increases the consumer price of 
SPs and WTs in the US and thus reduces the consumption of clean energy in the US (Figure 8, 
Country A is China and Country B is the US). US industry associations of firms that use these goods 
repeatedly highlighted that the US CVD will indeed hurt the development of domestic clean energy by 
making SPs and WTs more expensive (SEIA 2013). 
Another effect of the CVD is to increase the price received by US producers of these products, 
which will in turn increase their production. Given that US consumption decreases and US production 
increases, the import demand of SPs and WTs by the US will decline. To the extent that the US is a 
“large” economy in these markets the international price of SPs and WTs will decrease. Thus 
consumers in the rest of the world will benefit. Countries that are net importers of SPs and WTs will 
experience a terms-of-trade improvement, while the opposite is true for net exporters of SPs and WTs. 
More importantly, whether world consumption of clean energy will increase and 
consumption/production of carbon-fuel energy will decrease depends on the magnitude of the effects 
on US consumption vs. ROW consumption. 
Since the US is a net importer of SPs and WTs, its terms-of-trade will improve with the CVD, 
however this might not offset the distortions implied by the CVD – the standard distortions on the 
consumption and production sides plus the distortion associated with the local market failure – 
especially for very high levels of the CVD rate. In other words, US social welfare might very well 
decrease. So the question is why would the US government choose to impose CVDs? 
There are a number of possible answers to this question. The first one is related to strategic trade-
policy considerations, which are relevant if the market considered is not perfectly competitive. One of 
the goals of the Chinese subsidies might be to dominate the SPs and WTs world markets, which is 
likely to be a goal of US policy as well. One of the main results of the strategic-trade-policy literature 
(Brander and Spencer 1985) is that an export subsidy imposed by a foreign government (China) will 
increase foreign welfare if there is no retaliation by the domestic government. However, under certain 
conditions, the optimal response by the domestic (US) government to the Chinese subsidy is indeed a 
partial CVD (Dixit 1988). Finally Collie (1991) shows that the CVD discourages the export subsidy. 
We have insufficient evidence to sort through the motivational question here. 
3.6 Overall Assessment from an Economic Point of View 
Our reading of the literature related to this case is that, while the Chinese subsidy might be partly 
motivated by strategic considerations of the Chinese government to protect and develop its own 
industry of SPs and WTs, at the same time the Chinese subsidy is also consistent with the 
environmental goal of promoting renewable energy and reducing CO2 emissions in China and abroad. 
The Chinese subsidy is probably one of the drivers of the big reduction in world prices of these 
products, making it cheaper all over the world to install SPs and WTs. At the same time, the existing 
literature views the countervailing duty as mainly a protectionist measure to help the local (US) SPs 
and WTs industries, with potentially detrimental effects from an environmental point of view. 
We agree with this point of view. Subsidies to SPs and WTs can indeed address 
market failures associated with the carbon-intensive electricity production. More importantly, 
since the subsidies were not directly targeted at exports, they did not reduce Chinese 
consumption of these goods. There is also evidence that Chinese prices of SPs and WTs 
decreased and their installation in China greatly increased in the last few years, which is 
consistent with environmental goals. 
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But in general, how efficient are subsidies in addressing the externality associated with fossil fuel 
consumption? The Chinese subsidies can address a market failure but they may also introduce other 
distortions. For example, it might be that the reduction in pollution associated with production of 
Chinese SPs and WTs is smaller than that of US SPs and WTs. If so, a “world” social-planner would 
prefer that these subsidies be allocated to US-based production. 
What about the CVD imposed by the US? As in the standard case of a tariff, the CVD creates 
distortions, which are likely to more than offset any welfare-enhancing impact of the CVD. First, 
consumer prices are going to increase in the US, which will lead to smaller consumption in the US of 
SPs and WTs.
 
Is there a terms of trade (TofT) rationale for the CVD? The CVD will further decrease 
the world price of SPs and WTs, which improves the TofT of the US and of any importer of those 
goods. In addition, the reduction in the international price of SPs and WTs due to the CVD will 
increase ROW consumption of clean energy and reduce ROW pollution. Note, however, that if the US 
imposed a subsidy, not a CVD, it would still promote US production of these goods without distorting 
US consumer prices. 
Does this call for changing the WTO rules on trade remedies against foreign subsidies so that 
countries, at least in the case of environmental goods, are only able to impose “countervailing” 
subsidies as opposed to countervailing duties? Unfortunately, a complete analysis of this important 
questions is well outside the scope of this paper. 
4. Conclusions: Reconciling the legal and Economic Perspectives 
Is the decision by the AB in this case consistent with our answers to the questions above? In other 
words, did the AB make a decision that promotes environmental goals? The AB decision was not 
focused on environmental policy or global social welfare. The decision was based on an analysis of 
the rules of the SCM Agreement — so the doctrinal analysis was whether the US’s CVD procedures 
were consistent with WTO minimum requirements. The AB decision made it more difficult for a 
nation to apply “out-of-country” benchmarks (making it harder, but not impossible, to impose higher 
CVDs). If lower (or no CVDs) is better for the environment, then the AB decision pushes WTO law in 
this direction, although only a little bit. The ruling still allows CVDs on environmental goods 
regardless of a social welfare analysis of whether CVDs would be optimal in each case. In addition, 
the SCM Agreement allows WTO members to apply domestic remedies (such as CVDs) without 
effective WTO review for four years or more, which is particularly harmful in an industry that has 
rapid technological change, such as the SP and WT industries. Thus, any real advancement in the 
liberalization of trade in environmental goods will probably require a negotiated agreement rather than 
judicial interpretations of the current WTO Agreements. 
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5. Figures and Tables  
Figure 1. Net Exports of Solar Panels by China (millions of USD) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
Figure 2. Net Exports of Wind Turbines by China (millions of USD) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
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Figure 3. Net Exports of Solar Panels by the US (millions of USD) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
Figure 4. Net Exports of Wind Turbines by the US (millions of USD) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
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Table 1. Top importers and exporters of SPs and WTs in 2013 
Solar Panels 
 
Wind Turbines 
Top 
importers 
Top 
exporters 
Top net 
exporters  
Top 
importers 
Top 
exporters 
Top net 
exporters 
China China China 
 
United 
Kingdom 
Denmark Denmark 
Japan Japan Malaysia 
 
Germany China China 
United States Korea, Rep. Philippines 
 
Romania Spain Turkey 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Germany Singapore 
 
Canada Turkey Spain 
Germany Malaysia Korea, Rep. 
 
United States India India 
Korea, Rep. United States Sweden 
 
Indonesia Germany Portugal 
Mexico Singapore 
Slovak 
Republic  
Sweden United States Italy 
United 
Kingdom 
Philippines Mongolia 
 
Australia Portugal 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Netherlands Netherlands 
  
Nigeria Indonesia Mexico 
India Mexico 
  
Brazil Italy 
Czech 
Republic 
Italy 
United 
Kingdom   
France Sweden Vietnam 
Singapore France 
  
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
South Africa 
France Italy 
  
Morocco Mexico 
Slovak 
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Figure 5. Market Shares of Top 10 Wind Turbine Manufacturers, 2012 
 
Source: REN21 – Renewables 2013 Global Status Report 
Figure 6. Market Shares of Top 15 Solar PV Module Manufacturers, 2012 
 
Source: REN21 – Renewables 2013 Global Status Report 
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Figure 7. Market Shares by Locally-Owned Firms in Leading Domestic Wind Markets, 2012 
 
Source: Lewis (2014a) 
 
Figure 8 
 
Source: Baylis (2007) 
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